The paper surveys a theory of FDI, which captures a unique feature: hands-on management standards, that enable investors to react in real time to a changing economic environment. Equipped with superior managerial skills, foreign direct investors are able to outbid portfolio investors for the top productivity firms in a particular industry in which they have specialized in the source country.
Introduction
The name "Foreign Direct Investment" usually brings to mind a significant contribution of FDI to domestic investment and to capital inflows. However, there has been a lot of skepticism concerning the contribution of FDI to these engines of growth. As noted by Froot (1993) , FDI (the purchase by a domestic resident of a controlling stake in a foreign company) actually requires neither capital flows nor investment in capacity. Conceptually, FDI is an extension of corporate control over international boundaries: "When Japaneseowned Bridgestone takes control over the US firm Firestone, capital need not flow into the US. The equity purchase can largely be financed by US domestic lenders. Any borrowing by Bridgestone from foreign-based third parties also does not qualify as FDI (although it would count as an inflow of portfolio capital into the US). And, of course, in such acquisition there is no investment expenditure; merely an international transfer in the title of corporate assets." Does this example capture the essence of FDI in emerging economies?
The answer we provide in this paper, based on a new theory, and new empirical evidence, is that FDI flows does play an important role in the skimming of high productivity investment projects and thereby contributes significantly to domestic investment in both the quantity and the quality dimensions.
Old and New Theories
Theories of FDI can essentially be divided into two categories: micro (industrial organization) theories and macro-finance (cost of capital) theories. The early literature that explains FDI in microeconomic terms focuses on market imperfections, and on the desire of multinational enterprises to expand their market power (see Caves (1971) ). Subsequent literature centered more on firm-specific advantages, owing to product superiority or cost advantages, stemming from economies of scale, multi-plants economies and advanced technology, or superior marketing and distribution (see Helpman (1984) ). According to this view, multinationals find it cheaper to expand directly in a foreign country, rather than through trade, in cases where the advantages associated with cost or product are based on internal, indivisible assets based on knowledge and technology. Alternative explanations for FDI have focused on regulatory restrictions, including tariffs, quotas, that either encourage or discourage cross-border acquisitions, depending on whether one considers horizontal or vertical integrations.
Studies examining the macroeconomic effects of exchange rate on FDI focussed on the positive effects of an exchange rate depreciation of the host country on FDI inflows, because it lowers the cost of production and investment in the host countries, raising the profitability of foreign direct investment. The wealth effect is another channel through which a depreciation of the real exchange rate could raise FDI. A depreciation of the real exchange rate, by raising the relative wealth of foreign firms, could make it easier for those firms to use retained profits to finance investment abroad and to post a collateral in borrowing from domestic lenders in the host country capital market (see Froot (1991) and Razin and Sadka (2001) ). There is also a large literature on different forms of spillovers from inward investors in the form of new technologies, new ideas and capital accumulation on the growth of output in the domestic economy. (see Blomstrom, Kokko and Globerman (2001) ).
What is the essential difference between portfolio investment and FDI investment from the point of view of corporate governance?
Management under portfolio equity ownership may be plagued by a free-rider problem.
Under disperse ownership, if an individual shareholder does something to improve the quality of management, the benefits will accrue also to all other shareholders, see Oliver
Hart. In contrast, FDI investor, who is endowed with management skills and gains control of the firm, has better incentives to pursue proper monitoring of management, and will be in better position to micro manage the firm. Furthermore, based on possessing "intangible capital" in her source country, the FDI investor can apply more efficient management standards in the host country compared to domestic investors. Thus, the unique advantage to FDI, that has only recently been explored, is the potential for superior micromanagement, based on the specialization in niches of industry. Important issues with FDI from this standpoint are: (1) Which are the salient characteristics of the free-FDI-flows equilibrium, when FDI investors take control over domestic firms. (2) What constitute the gains from FDI flows to the host economy, given that the foreign investors appropriate the private rewards resulting from their superior management skills; and (3) Whether or not the free-FDI-flows regime is more efficient than free-portfolio-flows regime.
In an integrated capital market, with full information, all forms of capital flows (FDI, loans, and Portfolio equity and debt) are indistinguishable. In the presence of incomplete information, these flows are significantly different from one another. In Razin and Sadka (2002) , we developed a stylized model of FDI in the presence of imperfect information with respect to the firm's productivity.
We formalized the unique advantage of FDI investment over other types of investment in a stylized model. Suppose that initially all firms are still owned by original (domestic)
uninformed owners, and suppose that the productivity shock is purely idiosyncratic. At the beginning of the first period, when investment decisions are made, firms are still uninformed about the productivity shock (the productivity level of the specific firm which they own). It will be revealed only in the second period, when output from new capital becomes public knowledge. In order to make new investment the firm must incur first a fixed setup cost. As the firms are all ex-ante identical, if they have to make the investment decision based on this level of information, they will all invest the same, in accordance with the expected level of the productivity factor. Assume now that at this stage, before the productivity factor is known, foreign direct investors step in. Once acquiring and effectively managing the firm, the FDI investor can better monitor the productivity of the firm than her domestic investor counterpart. She can thus fine-tune the level of capital stock more closely to the value of the productivity factor. Anticipating this fine-tuned investment schedule, the value of the firm to the potential FDI investor is larger than the reservation value to the original owner, and the corresponding bid value to potential domestic investors. Therefore, FDI investors will outbid domestic investors for the firms in the domestic industry. Competition among potential FDI investors will drive up the price close to the price which reflect the upgraded management of the firm. The initial domestic owners will gain the rent, which is equal to difference between the FDI investor's shadow price and the initial owner's reservation price.
If the competition between potential FDI investors is perfect, all the benefits from the superior FDI management skills accrue to the host economy, leaving the FDI investors with a return on their investment just equalling the world rate of interest. The gains to the host economy from FDI inflows can on this case be classified into two categories. First, there are the conventional gains that stem from opening the economy to the new flow of capital, thereby allowing a more efficient intertemporal allocation of consumption (e.g., via consumption smoothing). Second, there are the intrinsic gains associated with the superior micro-management by FDI investors. The entire gain of the FDI investors is captured by the domestic economy because of assumed perfect competition among these investors over the domestic firms. If, however, there is imperfect competition among FDI investors the gains will split between them and the host country.
The economic gains from FDI, relative to portfolio inflows, lie only in the efficiency of investment, since in both cases there are consumption smoothing effects and the same world interest rate (r) prevails in the host country in both the FDI-flows regime and the Portfolio-flows regime. In other words, the gains from FDI, in comparison to portfolio flows, do not include the traditional gains from opening up the domestic capital market to foreign capital inflows because these traditional gains are present also in the Portfolio-flows regime. Razin and Sadka (2002) were able also to show that, under some plausible conditions on the form of the production function, the size of the aggregate stock of capital is larger under FDI than under Portfolio equity flows.
The Evidence
Like its theoretical counterpart, empirical work has tended to focus either on underlying factors to explain the location of FDI flows across countries or on explaining the cyclical behaviour of FDI flows using macroeconomic variables, and assessing the contribution of FDI flows to investment and growth.
To what extent is there empirical support for such claims of the significant impact of FDI on domestic investment? An additional (striking) feature of FDI flows that was noted in previous literature is that the share of FDI in total inflows is higher in riskier countries, as measured either by countries' credit ratings for sovereign (government) debt or other indicators of country risk (see Figure 2 ). There is also some evidence that the FDI share is higher in countries where the quality of corporate governance institutions is lower. What can explain these seemingly paradoxical findings? One explanation is that FDI is more likely, compared with other forms of capital flows, to take place in countries with missing or inefficient markets. In such settings, foreign investors will prefer to operate directly instead of relying on local financial markets, suppliers, or legal arrangements. countries. Second, the ease of communications between the source country and the destination country (as measured by telephone densities in each country) is found to have positive effects on the size of FDI flows. Third, countries with higher debt-equity ratios of publcly traded companies attract less FDI flows; these findings are summarized in Table 1 .
Determinants of FDI Flows: A Gravity
In Loungani, Mody, Razin and Sadka (2003) we interpreted the industry-specialization measure in the source country as an indication of a comparative advantage to the potential foreign direct investors in eliciting good investment opportunities in the destination country, relative to domestic investors in the host country. This advantage may stem, for example, from the ability of FDI investors to apply better industry-specific micromanagement standards. In the theory this element is captured by assuming a lower cost of cream (high-productivity-firms)-skimming on the part of foreign direct investors. The second category of variables underscores the role of information as a determinant of FDI inflows. As banks are the main providers of debt capital in emerging markets, and they usually conduct rigorous scrutiny of the credit worthiness of their debtors, we conjecture that, ceteris paribus, firms with high debt-equity ratio tend to be more transparent. In this case, the advantage of FDI investors in their cream-skimming skills (that is, the selection of high productivity firms) is less pronounced and therefore FDI inflows are less abundant. 
FDI Flows, Investment and Growth: Panel Data
Recently, Hecht, Razin and Shinar (2002) find that the effect of FDI inflows on domestic investment is significantly larger than either portfolio equity or loan inflows; see table 2.
They provide also evidence that FDI inflows promote efficiency: The effect of FDI on GDP growth is higher than the effect of other inflows, after controlling for the effect of capital accumulation on GDP growth; see table 3.
Empirical Framework for the Panel-Data Analysis
In this sub-section we describe our econometric approach for the estimation of the interactions between domestic investment, FDI flows, international loans, and international portfolio investment. The sample consists of 64 developing countries, including Israel 1 , in the period 1976 to 1997 (22 years in total; see appendix 2). All the variables but the dummies are expressed in terms of gDP percentages. The source of data is the WDI database (see appendix 1). The system of equations is given by: Table 3 describes the effects of capital inflows on domestic investment.
Domestic Investment: Findings
The coefficient of FDI is significant in the OLS and TSLS regressions. FDI long-run effect on domestic investment is 0.94 in the OLS regression and 0.68 in the TSLS regression.
Thus, potential for an upward bias in the OLS estimation procedure appears to be validated. Estimated using Eviews software. 3 The long-term effect expresses the lagged timed structure of the 2SLS estimation. It is calculated as the sum of a converging geometric series: β xi / ( 1-β x(-1)I ) Table 4 describes the effect of domestic investment on FDI inflows, allowing for the effects of a group of other traditional variables, such as growth, and capital controls.
The coefficient of domestic investment is positive and significant in both the OLS and the TSLS regression. The long-run effect is in the OLS (0.08) is smaller than in the TSLS (0.14). Loan Inflows Table 5 describes the effect of domestic investment on loans inflows, allowing for the effect of growth. The coefficient of domestic investment is negative and non-significant in the OLS but positive and significant in the TSLS regression. The long run effect moves up from -0.03 in the OLS regression to 0.08 in the TSLS regression. Portfolio Inflows Table 6 describes the effect of domestic investment on portfolio investment inflows. The explanatory power of the regression is however poor and most of the right-hand side variables have non-significant coefficients. The regression analysis, effectively, flashes out an auto-correlation process of the portfolio investment flows. ) , FDI, P, L and G are in terms of ratio to GDP, t values appear in parentheses. Table 8 describes the effect of output growth on FDI inflows, allowing for the effects of a group of other control variables, such as domestic investment, and capital controls.
FDI Inflows
The coefficient of output growth is positive and significant in the TSLS regression. The longrun effect is 0.05. Loan Inflows Table 10 describes the effect of output growth on loans inflows, allowing for the effect of domestic investment. The coefficient of output growth is non-significant in the both regressions. Table 11 describes the effect of output growth on portfolio investment inflows. The explanatory power of the regression is however poor and most of the right-hand side variables have non-significant coefficients. The regression analysis, effectively, flashes out an autocorrelation process of the portfolio investment flows. We summarize the main findings of the panel-data analysis, as follows.
Portfolio Inflows
(1) FDI flows have an independent larger effect on domestic investment and output growth than loan flows and portfolio flows (the latter are the least effective).
(2) Among the main determinants of capital inflows, domestic investment, or output growth, have more pronounced effects on FDI inflows, than on loans and portfolio flows.
Conclusion
Kindleberger (1969) suggested that in order to think about FDI we must ask not why capital might flow into a country, but rather why some particular asset would be worth more under foreign than under domestic control. I discussed here a theory of FDI, which captures a uniqe feature: hands-on management standards that enable investors to react in real time to a changing economic environment. Equipped with superior managerial skills, foreign direct investors are able to outbid portfolio investors for the top productivity firms in a particular industry in which they have specialized in the source country. Consequently, FDI investors would make investment, both larger, and higher quality, than the domestic investors. The theory can explain both two-way FDI flows among developed countries, and one-way FDI flows from developed to developing countries. Gains to the host country from FDI stem from the informational value of FDI.
The predictions of the theory are consistent with the evidence: larger FDI coefficients in the domestic-investment and output-growth regressions relative to the portfolio equity and international loans inflow coefficients, reflects a unique role for FDI in the domestic investment and growth process.
I would like to end with a cautionary word based on the Irish case. It may be argued that the heavy subsidization of FDI in Ireland in the past two decades resulted in impressive GDP growth, but with less pronounced effect on the well being of Irish residents, as proxied by the Irish GNP growth rates. Gains to the country that serve as host to FDI flows are not necessarily captured by the increase in domestic investment, and productivity, to which FDI flows give rise.
Capital control data was taken from IMF publications.
A few missing data items regarding loans for Israel were taken from the bank of Israel resources. 
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